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INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS” or the “Convention”)1 is the key legal framework for all 
activities in the oceans. On 9 June 2014, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, in opening the commemoration of the twentieth 
anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention, referred to the 
Convention as one of the most significant and visionary multilateral 
instruments of the twentieth century. He noted that most of the 
provisions of the Convention, usually referred to as the “Constitution 
                                                            
*European Commission Legal Service, Brussels; Ph.D. (Cambridge, UK); adjunct 
professor at University of Helsinki. The views expressed in this article are personal. 
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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for the oceans,” are now widely recognized as reflecting customary 
international law.2 This reflects a generally held view, including by 
the EU and its member States,3 which is to a large extent shared also 
by States not party to the Convention, notably the United States.4 
The Convention is of critical importance for the peaceful use of 
the oceans. Its 320 articles and nine annexes cover almost all aspects 
of international law relating to the oceans. It takes largely a zonal 
approach to the law of the sea, including zones such as territorial sea, 
continental shelf, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and 
high seas. Its comprehensive subject matter covers areas including 
freedom of navigation, utilization of resources, the protection and 
preservation of the maritime environment and international dispute 
settlement. Also, for States that are not parties to the Convention, 
notably the United States, it is the central instrument for ocean 
policy.5 
UNCLOS was negotiated in the 1970s and early 1980s when 
major developments in the law of the sea took place. In particular, it 
was foreseen that the establishment of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones (“EEZ”) was to be confirmed in the Convention 
which triggered the necessity for the then the European Economic 
Community (“EEC”) to become a party to UNCLOS because of its 
exclusive competence in the area of fisheries management and 
conservation.  
UNCLOS serves as an illustration, by now already a more 
general phenomenon, where the EU participates in international 
agreements as a contracting party. This follows ultimately from the 
                                                            
2. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Rep. on its 24th Sess., June 9–13, 2014, ¶ 14, U.N. 
Doc. SPLOS/277 (Jul. 14, 2014). 
3. EU Statement at United Nations General Assembly: Oceans and Law of Sea, 
Including Sustainable Fisheries (Dec. 9, 2014), available at http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/
article_15840_en.htm (“The EU and its Member States continue to believe that this framework 
convention represents the constitution of the oceans, reflects customary international law and 
establishes the overarching legal framework within which all activities in oceans and seas must 
be carried out and wish that the goal of universal participation in this Convention will soon be 
met.”). 
4. James E. Hickey Jr., The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in OCEAN 
AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 365, 365 (Donal C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton 
eds., American Bar Association, 2d ed. 2015 (forthcoming)). 
5. See generally T.T.B. Koh, Constitution for the Oceans, in 1 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982—A COMMENTARY 11 (Nordquist, M.H. ed., 
1985); Shirley C. Scott, The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans, in 
STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE ROLE OF THE LOS CONVENTION 26 
(Alex G. Oude Elferink, ed., 2005); Hickey, supra note 4, at 365. 
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public powers conferred by its member States. The EU is not a State, 
but it participates in international agreements alongside States. This 
unique position is reflected in the provisions of UNCLOS. Referring 
to entities such as the EU which become parties to the Convention in 
accordance with its conditions, Article 1(2)(2) of UNCLOS provides 
that the Convention applies to them “mutatis mutandis” and the term 
“States parties” refers to them to that extent.   
On the one hand, this implies that the EU is a holder of rights 
and obligations under the Convention. On the other hand, the 
conditions for its participation require that the EU inform the others 
of its competences. This is important since the EU member states are 
parties to the Convention as well. In this respect, UNCLOS forms a 
part of a common phenomenon known as “mixed agreements” in 
terms of EU language. UNCLOS is the first major multilateral 
convention of this kind. 
This Essay comments on EU participation in UNCLOS and its 
implementation. It addresses first the nature of the EU as a 
contracting party and outlines the modalities for its participation. It 
then reviews the international implementation of the UNCLOS 
obligations and the implementation/status of the Convention under 
EU law. 
I. EUROPEAN UNION PARTICIPATION IN UNCLOS 
It is useful to recall that in the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of Sea (1973–1982) the then EEC was not a party to the 
negotiation of the Convention, but it was given an observer status in 
1974. The EEC was not directly represented but its voice was heard 
through its member States, in particular the rotating presidencies 
provided that they managed to coordinate their positions.6 The 
European Commission, the executive body, felt that it was necessary 
for the EEC to become a party to the Convention. It has been 
estimated that had it not been for the exclusive Community 
competence in the area of fisheries, the EEC member States would 
not have fought the EEC to become party to the Convention.7 One of 
                                                            
6. BEN-JACOB DIEWITZ, THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS MEMBER STATES & THE LAW OF 
THE SEA: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER 
STATES IN THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW PERTAINING TO THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 13–15 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Bristol, Mar. 2012). 
7. Id. at 21–22. 
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the greatest achievements of the EEC and its member States was the 
“EEC clause” which permitted the Community to become a 
contracting party. While the EEC was not the only international 
organization which was an observer in the conference, it was clear 
from the beginning that it had a special status due to its exclusive 
competence whereby its member States could no longer act in an 
independent way.8 The Community participation in UNCLOS was far 
from a given. The United States in particular was concerned of the 
risk of double representation, which could lead to unjustifiably strong 
European influence. Finally the EEC member States convinced other 
States opposed to the EEC clause to accept such a clause in order to 
bind the member States fully to the Convention following from the 
conferral of competences.9 That clause is now contained in Article 
305(1)(f) and Annex IX of the Convention.  
A. Modalities of EU Participation 
Article 305(1)(f) provides that the Convention is open for 
signature to international organization, in accordance with Annex IX. 
Annex IX contents are fairly detailed and tailor-made for the EU. 
Article 1 of Annex XI defines an international organization as “an 
intergovernmental organization constituted by states to which its 
member states have transferred competence over matters governed by 
the Convention, including competence to enter into treaties in respect 
of those matters.” More recent multilateral treaty practice refers to 
such an organization most often as a “regional economic integration 
organization” (“REIO”) even though the actual competences of an 
organization such as the EU are not anymore confined to economic 
matters. The key element is the emphasis on the conferral of 
competence from the member States to the organization, rather than 
using the traditional definition of an international organization as one 
based on an inter-state treaty and having international legal 
personality.  
Annex IX sets out a number of conditions that apply for the 
participation of such an organization as a contracting party. Article 3 
provides that the organization may deposit its instrument of formal 
confirmation (ratification) if a majority of its member States have 
deposit or have deposited their instruments of ratification. It provides 
                                                            
8. Id. at 21. 
9. Id. at 27. 
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moreover that the instrument that it has deposited shall contain certain 
undertakings and declarations relating to the extent of its participation 
and rights and obligations as well as declarations and communications 
of its competences, which are laid down in Articles 4 and 5 
respectively.  
Article 4(1) requires that the organization accept that the rights 
and obligations of States under the Convention in respect of which 
competence has been transferred to it by the member States which are 
parties to the Convention. Article 4(3) specifies that member States 
shall not exercise competences which have been transferred to the 
organization and Article 4(4) aims to prevent kinds of double 
influence in providing that the participation of the organization shall 
“in no case entail an increase of the representation to which its 
member States which are States Parties would otherwise be entitled, 
including rights in decision-making.” Pursuant to Article 4(6), “[i]n 
the event of a conflict between the obligations of the an international 
organization under this Convention and its obligations under the 
agreement establishing the organization or any acts relating to it, the 
obligations under this Convention shall prevail.” This provision 
makes a difference between the internal law of the organization and 
the observance of the Convention known from Article 27 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, to the effect that 
the organization cannot invoke its internal law justify its failure to 
observe the Convention.  
Article 5(1) provides that the organization’s instrument of formal 
confirmation shall contain a declaration specifying the matters 
governed by the Convention “in respect of which competence has 
been transferred to the organization by its member States which are 
Parties to the Convention.” 
Article 6 concerns responsibility and liability. Article 6(1) 
specifies that “[p]arties which have competence under Article 5 of 
this Annex shall have responsibility for failure to comply with 
obligations or for any other violation of this Convention.” Article 6(2) 
commits the organization and its member States to provide for 
information as to who has responsibility in respect of any specific 
matter. This is complemented by a kind of default clause which 
provides that failure to provide information within a reasonable time 
or provision of contradictory information shall result in joint and 
several liability. 
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When joining UNCLOS, the EU made the requisite declaration 
of competence.10 It contains a description of the different 
competences involved, namely exclusive Union competence (e.g., 
conservation and management of fishing resources and customs) and 
matters that fall within the shared competence of the Union and its 
member States (e.g., maritime transport, safety of shipping, and 
prevention of pollution). The EU declaration of competence states 
that “the scope and exercise of such Community competence are, by 
their nature, subject to continuous development” and the declaration 
will be completed or amended if necessary. No such formal 
amendment has been made or requested so far. 
B. Participation of EU Member States 
It follows from the nature of the Convention (internally a so-
called mixed agreement) that the EU member States are contracting 
parties in respect of their national competences and, in their 
declarations at the time of ratification, refer to their membership in 
the EU. The EU and its member States often act largely as a group, 
which is visible in the Meetings of States Parties and the UN General 
Assembly in particular when making statements which are frequently 
done jointly. 
Since both the EU and its member States participate in the 
Convention, it is of paramount importance that they act in a uniform 
manner maintaining the unity of the European Union. This 
necessitates regular coordination meetings, which are carried out both 
in Brussels and at the UN. This coordination is by now a well-
established practice and is taken for granted by all participants on the 
EU side. This close coordination is ultimately guided by the EU law 
principle of sincere cooperation, established in the EU's founding 
Treaties.11 From early on, this principle has been of paramount 
importance in all “mixed agreement” situations in maintaining 
cohesion and unity within the EU, and the European Court of Justice 
                                                            
10. See Council Decision 98/392, 1998 O.J. L 179, 129 (EC).  
11. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4(3), 2010 O.J. C 
83/01 at 18 (“Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member 
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s 
tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives.”).  
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has played a significant role in elaborating the principle for 
multilateral contexts.12  
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF UNCLOS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
The implementation of UNCLOS is carried out both by the EU 
and/or its member States within their respective competences. As 
indicated above, the EU and its member States undertake to inform 
the others which among them is competent in a relevant subject 
matter. If this does not work, they run the risk of becoming jointly 
responsible vis-à-vis third parties for any breaches of Convention 
obligations. As the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(“ITLOS”) has recently recalled, other States may, pursuant to article 
6, paragraph 2, of Annex IX to the Convention, request an 
international organization or its member States, which are parties to 
the Convention, for information as to who has responsibility in 
respect of any specific matter. Failure to do so within a reasonable 
time or the provision of contradictory information results in joint and 
several liability of the international organization and the member 
States concerned.13 
The EU takes part in the implementation and further 
development of the Convention in the frameworks of the State Parties 
                                                            
12. See Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. I-5272 (stating that “where it is apparent that the 
subject-matter of an agreement or convention falls in part within the competence of the 
Community and in part within that of the Member States, it is essential to ensure close 
cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions, both in the process of 
negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into. That 
obligation to cooperate flows from the requirement of unity in the international representation 
of the Community.”). More recently, it was confirmed that:  
Member States are subject to special duties of action and abstention in a situation in 
which the Commission has submitted to the Council proposals which, although they 
have not been adopted by the Council, represent the point of departure for concerted 
Community action . . . . That is especially true in a situation such as that in the 
present case which is characterized . . . by a unilateral proposal which dissociates 
the Member State in question from a concerted common strategy within the Council 
and was submitted within an institutional and procedural framework such as that of 
the Stockholm Convention . . . . Such a situation is likely to compromise the 
principle of unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member 
States and weaken their negotiating power with regard to the other parties to the 
Convention concerned. 
Commission v. Sweden, Case C-246/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-03317 ¶ 74–103. 
13. See Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission (“SRFC”), Advisory Opinion of 2 Apr. 2015, available at https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/advisory_opinion/C21_AdvOp_02.04.pdf. 
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Meetings as well as the UN General Assembly. They constitute but 
related frameworks and they differ in composition. Participation in 
UNCLOS also implies that the EU is subject to the Convention 
dispute resolution mechanisms as further provided therein.  
A. The Meetings of State Parties and the UN General Assembly 
UNCLOS established a “light” institutional framework for 
addressing the implementation of the Convention. A central body is 
the Meeting of States Parties (“SPLOS”), which receives a report of 
the UN Secretary General, in its function as the depository, 
addressing “issues of a general nature.”14 The EU participates in the 
SPLOS meetings in its full rights as a contracting party, while 
especially the United States acts in its capacity as observer as it is not 
a contracting party. 
The SPLOS acts under a fairly narrow mandate under Article 
319 of UNCLOS. It reviews the recent developments under the 
Convention and provides a possibility to react to these developments. 
It also addresses administrative/budgetary matters concerning 
different bodies established under the Convention, and it decides on 
the appointment of judges to the ITLOS. Amongst other parties, the 
EU participates in these meetings on a regular basis along with its 
member States. 
A regular agenda item in recent SPLOS meetings has concerned 
the administrative functioning of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (“CLCS”).15 It is a technical treaty body, consisting 
of scientists, established under UNCLOS (Article 76(8) and Annex 
II).16 The CLCS’s task is to give recommendations to coastal States 
on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The limits of the shelf 
established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations 
shall be final and binding. The large number of State submissions in 
recent years, altogether seventy-seven submissions, has resulted in a 
                                                            
14. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 319(2)(a), Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
15. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Rep. of the 24th Meeting of States Parties, 14 
July 2014, U.N. Doc. SPLOS/277, available at  http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? 
symbol=SPLOS/277. 
16. Bjorn Kunoy, The Terms of Reference of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf: A Creeping Legal Mandate, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 109 (2012). 
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significant workload for the Commission.17 Within the EU, these are 
typically matters which fall primarily within the competence of the 
EU member States, since they basically concern State borders. 
Several EU member States, including the United Kingdom, France, 
Spain, Ireland, and Denmark have made such submissions. 
At the same time, the UN General Assembly plays a role in 
respect of matters concerning the development of the law of the sea, 
and it partly also addresses issues relating to the Convention. There is 
some overlap concerning subject matter and perhaps even competition 
between these different bodies. Yet this has not led the parties of the 
Convention to fight over the role of the General Assembly on issues 
that could be addressed in SPLOS and both bodies continue 
addressing the law of the sea issues on a regular basis.18 
The EU has an observer status in the General Assembly, since 
2011 it can participate in the work of the official UN meetings in 
enhanced terms.19 In practice, given that most General Assembly 
resolutions are prepared in informal consultations, the EU can take 
part in the consultations despite its observer status.20 Regarding the 
work of certain sub-bodies under the General Assembly, notably the 
so-called Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and 
the Law of the Sea (“ICP”), established in 1999, participation is more 
open and covers inter alia “all parties to the Convention” which, in 
the case of the EU, is a way to attempt to bridge the traditional 
division between UN members and mere observers.21 That the 
                                                            
17. For the list of submissions and recommendations that have been done so far, see the 
information of the UN Secretariat. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 13 April 2015, available at http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.   
18. See generally Tullio Treves, The General Assembly and the Meetings of the States 
Parties in the Implementation of the LOS Convention, in STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE 
LAW OF THE SEA: THE ROLE OF THE LOS CONVENTION 55, 55 (Alex G. Oude Elferink ed., 
2005).  
19. See generally PEDRO ANTONIO SERRANO DE HARO, PARTICIPATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS: GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION 65/276 (CLEER, Working Paper 2012). 
20. See Esa Paasivirta & Dominic Porter, EU Coordination at the UN General Assembly 
and ECOSOC: A View From Brussels, A View from New York, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 35, 35 (Jan Wouters et al. ed., 2006). 
21. G.A. Res. 54/33, ¶ 3(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/33 (Jan. 18, 2000) (“The meetings will 
be open to all States Members of the United Nations, States members of the specialized 
agencies, all parties to the Convention . . . .”). 
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General Assembly has reaffirmed its role relating to the development 
of the law of the sea is seen, for instance, in relation to the work 
concerning the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction. It is foreseen that the 
General Assembly takes a decision in its sixty-ninth session (2015) on 
the development of a new international instrument (so-called 
implementation agreement) under the UNCLOS.22 
The fact that law of the sea related issues are being addressed 
within two separate frameworks does not appear to have caused 
serious concern, at least amongst the large majority of parties and UN 
members. However, the General Assembly framework remains a 
definite concern for the EU, since it is not a UN member, but acts as 
an observer in that context and its position is not equal to the 
members. It remains an observer status, even though the conditions 
for the EU participation in the work of the UN have been improved in 
the recent years. This is unfortunate, but not easily changeable, since 
the General Assembly resolutions, while only formally 
recommendations, can influence the development of customary 
international law, and the EU is bound by customary law, including 
under its own Treaties as discussed below. These status-related 
concerns come to the fore especially when negotiating new 
agreements within the General Assembly framework, in accordance 
with its procedures. In such situations in particular it is fully justified 
to expect that the working methods are adjusted to be fully equal to 
all participants, including to all contracting parties to UNCLOS, and 
the EU is one of them.  
B. Arbitration and Judicial Practice 
UNCLOS participation also implies that a contracting party is 
subject to the comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism 
established under Article 287 of the Convention. This entails several 
different procedures, including the ITLOS, the International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”), an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with 
Annex VII, and a special arbitration tribunal constituted in accordance 
with Annex VIII. The contracting parties can choose from these 
alternatives by making a declaration. Article 287(3) provides that a 
                                                            
22. U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/69/L.29, ¶ 214 (Dec. 
2014). 
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party to a dispute that is not covered by a declaration shall be deemed 
to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. 
The ICJ is not a possible option for dispute settlement in the case 
of the EU. This follows from the simple fact that the EU is not a state 
and thus it cannot be a party to the Statute of the ICJ, which is 
reserved for states only. This restriction applies even if a dispute 
would fall within the core competence areas of the EU. This reality 
was brought home in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. 
Canada) in the ICJ, even though this case originated from the time 
preceding the entry into force of UNCLOS. This case was in fact 
within the area of EU fisheries policy and thus within the area of EU 
exclusive competence. It concerned the activities of Spanish fishing 
vessels close to the Canadian coast that were affected by changes in 
Canadian fisheries legislation. Theoretically, the claim could have 
been brought by the EU in another forum than the ICJ, which could 
well be the case today following the entry into force of UNCLOS. 
However, due to the reason of not having access to the ICJ, the only 
option at the time was clearly for Spain as the flag State to bring the 
claim against the Canadian Government. The claim was ultimately 
rejected by the ICJ for lack of jurisdiction. This followed from the 
fact that Canada had shortly before amended its optional clause for 
ICJ jurisdiction to the effect that it lacked the consent of the Canadian 
Government and was prevented from assuming jurisdiction in 
disputes concerning fisheries conservation and management.23 
The ICJ aside, other options for dispute settlement under Article 
287 of UNCLOS would be ITLOS or special arbitration under Annex 
VIII, which is a dedicated arbitration procedure for certain areas 
                                                            
23.  Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 1998 I.C.J. 432, ¶ 61, 87 (Dec. 4). The 
dispute originated in 1994 from fishing activities off the Canadian coast in New Foundland 
partly belonging to high seas, located in the Grand Banks area covered by the North Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (“NAFO”). The same year, Canada amended its Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act to extend to part of the Grand Banks area. The Act also made it illegal for 
certain states to fish in the area, and in 1995 Spain and Portugal were added to that list. On 
May 10, 1994, Canada made a declaration, in accordance with Article 36(2) of the Statute of 
the ICJ, revoking its earlier declaration. The new declaration included a further reservation that 
excluded from the Court's jurisdiction “disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and 
management measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO 
Regulatory area . . . and the enforcement of such measures.” In March 1995 the Spanish 
flagged vessel Estai was intercepted by Canadian authorities in the Grand Banks area. The 
vessel was seized, and the master arrested for infringement of Canadian fishing regulations. 
The EU and Spain protested. On April 1995, an agreement was reached between the European 
Union and Canada removing Spain and Portugal from the list of states that were not allowed to 
fish in the area. The proceedings against Estai were discontinued. Id. ¶ 14, 18–22. 
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which require special expertise and fact-finding. However, for either 
of these options to apply it would require a declaration by the 
contracting party. In neither case has the EU made such a declaration 
either at the time of joining the Convention or thereafter.  
It follows from above that the “default clause” in Article 287(3) 
of UNCLOS applies in the case of the EU. Pursuant to that provision, 
a party to a dispute that is not covered by a declaration in force shall 
be deemed to have accepted arbitration under Annex VII of 
UNCLOS. This option is therefore the option for the EU to be 
involved in a dispute either as a claimant or defendant under 
UNLCOS. 
This has happened in two cases in the recent past, though in the 
end, both of them were settled amicably and thus there was no final 
decision. 
In the Swordfish Case (Chile v. European Community),24 Chile 
initiated arbitration proceedings in 2000 pursuant to UNCLOS Annex 
VII and a Special Chamber of ITLOS was established to deal with the 
dispute. Chile invoked its unilaterally set conservation measures 
regarding highly migratory fish, challenging the EC’s freedoms on the 
high seas in an area adjacent to Chile's exclusive economic zone. 
According to Article 116 of UNCLOS, all States have the right to 
ensure that their nationals can fish freely on the high seas while 
Article 64 sets a duty of cooperation between the coastal States and 
other States whose nationals fish in the region. The proceedings under 
UNCLOS followed immediately after the EC had submitted the 
dispute concerning Chile’s unilateral measures to the WTO requesting 
the establishment of a WTO panel (Chile—Measures Affecting the 
Transit and Importation of Swordfish). The EC complained of a 
violation of the GATT (Articles V and XI) by Chile as its measures 
prevented EC fishing vessels from unloading their swordfish in 
Chilean ports either to land or to transfer them to other vessels.25 
Chile’s defense, in turn, could rely on the general exceptions of the 
GATT (Article XX). There was no obvious reason to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the respective dispute resolution procedure in either 
case. However, no final decisions were reached on the merits and a 
potential conflict between the treaty regimes remained unresolved. 
                                                            
24. See Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-
Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Community), Case No. 7, Intl. Trib. on the Law of 
the Sea (2000). 
25. WT/DS193/1 of 26 April 2000. 
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While the parallel disputes were pending, the parties went on to 
continue their bilateral negotiations and a final compromise was 
reached after nine years of negotiations. This resulted in a bilateral 
arrangement that permitted both parties’ fishing activities of 
swordfish to continue within certain maximum limits and monitoring 
and providing for access to ports.26 After several suspensions since 
2001, the parties discontinued the ITLOS case in 2009 and the WTO 
case in 2010.27  
The EU has been more recently a party to another UNCLOS 
arbitration also involving interplay between UNCLOS and the WTO 
related to fixing fishing quotas and trade measures. This dispute 
originated in a dispute between the Faroe Islands (which are part of 
Denmark, but outside the EU) and the EU over the sharing of fishing 
quotas concerning Atlanto-Scandian herring. The stock has been 
managed through consultations amongst the relevant coastal States 
whose EEZ is visited by this fish during its migration cycle. In 
accordance with the sharing arrangements, it had been agreed that the 
share for the Faroe Islands was 5.16% of the Allowable Catch 
(“TAC”). In the coastal state consultations for the arrangements for 
2013, the Faroe Islands refused to continue the current sharing 
arrangement. Instead the Faroe Islands announced that a new catch 
limit of 105,230 tonnes had been set unilaterally for the Faroese fleet, 
which represented 17% of the recommended TAC. The EU 
considered, inter-alia, that the Faroe Islands had failed its cooperation 
obligations under UNCLOS (Article 61(2), Article 63(1-2)) and 
notified the Faroe Islands of its intention to identify it as a country 
allowing unsustainable fishing. In responding to the Commission 
notification, the Faroe Islands denied having withdrawn from the 
consultations and argued that the EU had no right to use coercive 
measures, but did not indicate any intention to amend its unilateral 
decision. The Commission concluded that the Faroe Islands had not 
given sufficiently substantiated reasons for its unilateral quota or the 
lack of cooperation. In order to counter what was seen as over-
exploitation of the stock, the EU adopted measures banning the 
import of fish or fishery products caught by vessels flying the flag of 
                                                            
26. Understanding concerning the conservation of swordfish stocks in the South Eastern 
Pacific Ocean, O.J. L 155/3 (June 22, 2010). 
27. See Order 2009/1 of 16 December 2009, www.itlos.org; Joint Communication 
WT/DS193/4, G/L/367/Add.1 June 2010.  
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the Faroe Islands and the vessels were subjected to restrictions on the 
use of EU ports.28   
In 2013, in the face of the EU measures, Denmark, in respect of 
the Faroe Islands, initiated the Atlanto-Scandian Herring Arbitration 
under Annex VII of UNCLOS, under the auspices of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, alleging violation by the EU of its cooperation 
obligations under UNCLOS (Article 63(1)).29 In parallel, the claimant 
initiated proceedings under the WTO dispute settlement to contest the 
GATT compatibility of the EU trade measures in European Union—
Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring.30 
Outside those proceedings contacts between the two parties 
continued, and a settlement was reached. The Faroe Islands reduced 
significantly its quota (from 105,230 tonnes for 2013 to 40,000 for 
2014). This, taken together with the quotas of the other coastal States, 
was not considered to undermine the conservation efforts of the EU, 
and the EU repealed its trade measures.31 Both cases were terminated 
in September 2014. 
Reference should in addition be made to the ITLOS Advisory 
Opinion in Case No. 2132, given on April 2, 2015, to a request by the 
Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (“SRFC”). The SRFC, a West-
African fisheries organization involving seven member States, 
introduced a request for an ITLOS advisory opinion for four questions 
related to flag State liability for illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(“IUU”) fishing activities conducted within the EEZ of States other 
than the flag State. The Tribunal was also requested to address a 
question concerning liability in a situation where a fishing license is 
issued to a vessel within the framework of an international agreement 
with an international organization in order to know where the flag 
State or the international organization should be held liable for the 
                                                            
28. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU), No. 793/2012, OJ L 223, at 1 (Aug. 21, 
2003).  
29. See In re Atlanto-Scandian Herring (Den. in respect of Faroe Is. v. E.U.) P.C.A. Case 
2013-30. 
30. See Request for Consultations by Denmark in Respect of the Faroe Islands, 
European Union—Measures on Atlanto-Scandian Herring, WTO Doc. WT/DS469/1 (Nov. 7, 
2013). 
31. See Commission Implementing Regulation 896/2014, Establishing Measures in 
Respect of the Faroe Islands to Ensure the Conservation of the Atlanto-Scandian Herring, 2014 
O.J. L 244/10. 
32. See Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission (Apr. 2, 2015), available at https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-
21/. 
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violation of the fisheries legislation of the coastal State by the vessel 
in question. This third question was clearly addressed to the EU. The 
ITLOS Advisory Opinion gave the following operative reply to that 
third question: 
172. The Tribunal holds that in cases where an international 
organization, in the exercise of its exclusive competence in 
fisheries matters, concludes a fisheries access agreement with an 
SRFC Member State, which provides for access by vessels flying 
the flag of its member States to fish in the exclusive economic 
zone of that State, the obligations of the flag State become the 
obligations of the international organization. The international 
organization, as the only contracting party to the fisheries access 
agreement with the SRFC Member State, must therefore ensure 
that vessels flying the flag of a member State comply with the 
fisheries laws and regulations of the SRFC Member State and do 
not conduct IUU fishing activities within the exclusive economic 
zone of that State. 
174. Accordingly, only the international organization may be 
held liable for any breach of its obligations arising from the 
fisheries access agreement, and not its member States. Therefore, 
if the international organization does not meet its “due diligence” 
obligations, the SFRC Member States may hold the international 
organization liable for the violation of their fisheries laws and 
regulations by a vessel flying the flag of a member State of that 
organization and fishing in the exclusive economic zones of the 
SRFC Member States within the framework of a fisheries access 
agreement between that organization and such Member States. 
This is in line with the EU observations. It was the first time that 
the EU participated in this kind of proceedings. The Commission, on 
behalf of the EU, had made written observations and appeared in the 
oral hearings. Certain EU member States had also made observations, 
primarily on the question of ITLOS jurisdiction, which was not 
addressed in the observations by the EU.  
The ITLOS Advisory Opinion is significant for the development 
of international law doctrine concerning responsibility of international 
organizations. The interesting point of the ITLOS approach is that it 
relates the question of responsibility to the competence of the 
organization, instead of premising it on whether the illegal conduct 
(act or omission) can be attributed to the organization via the conduct 
of its “organs or agents.” The latter approach has been followed by 
the International Law Commission (“ILC”) in dealing with the rules 
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of attribution.33 While this may be in line of a standard model of a 
“classical” international organization, it has been argued that that 
model is wholly inadequate in the case of a “regional integration 
organization” like the EU, which characteristically acts via the 
authorities of its member States implementing the decisions of the 
organization, and only sometimes and in certain areas through its own 
organs or agents.34 The ITLOS Opinion was the first time when an 
international judicial body articulated in such clear terms the 
connection between responsibility and the competence of the 
organization.35 The ITLOS Opinion contributes to further clarity of 
international law doctrine in the case of integration organizations such 
as the EU. 
It may be noted that on the EU internal scene, following the 
inter-institutional disagreement as to which institution should decide 
on the submission of observations, the Council brought proceedings 
against the Commission in Case C-73, Council v. Commission,36 
arguing that it should have been for the Council to make the final 
decision to decide on the submission of EU observations, due to its 
policy-making role under the EU Treaties (Article 16 of the Treaty on 
European Union, (“TEU”)), while the Commission defends its 
prerogatives to represent the EU in legal proceedings (Article 355 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). The 
case is pending before the EU Court of Justice.  
The above international practice reflects that other States 
consider that when the EU acts within its competence areas it is also 
fully competent in international law to stand for its international 
responsibilities resulting from its international obligations. In this 
respect, the law of the sea practice complements and consolidates the 
practice in other areas, in particular the WTO dispute resolution 
practice. The EU participation in legal proceedings also reflects its 
commitment to the rule of law, which is an external policy objective 
                                                            
33. See Article 6 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (2011), prepared by the ILC and now contained in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 66/100 adopted on 9 December 2011, available at  http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol= A/RES/66/100/ 
34. This is referred to as “competence model” (in contrast to “organic model”) in Pieter-
Jan Kuijper & Esa Paasivirta, EU International Responsibility and Its Attribution: From the 
Inside Looking Out, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 35, 
54 (Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2013). 
35. As such this is compatible with the practice of the WTO. See id. at 60–63. 
36. See Case C-73/14, Council v. Comm’n, [2014] E.C.R. 21. 
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set out in the EU founding treaties. It is provided therein, inter-alia 
that “the Union's action shall be guided by . . . the rule of law . . . and 
respect for the principles of . . . international law.”37 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF UNCLOS UNDER EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW 
A. Status of International Law Under EU Law 
From early on, under the influence of the Court of Justice, EU 
law has been viewed as a separate or new legal order, as stated in the 
seminal cases Van Gend & Loos and Costa v. Enel.38 The autonomous 
nature of EU law applies in particular in relation to international law, 
as recently highlighted in the EU Court's Opinion 2/13.39  
The view of EU law as an autonomous legal order calls for some 
organizing principles in relation to international law. The question 
is—to a certain extent—addressed in the EU's founding Treaties, and 
the EU judiciary has shaped the principles further. Basically, such 
questions of inter-system relations fall under constitutional law 
perspective and raise a series of different but inter-related issues. We 
will first address the question of international courts, as follow-up to 
the issues discussed in the previous section, and then address other 
relevant issues, for instance how international law affects the 
interpretation and validity of the internal EU law and the closely 
related issue of whether individuals can invoke international law in 
the EU courts.  
Regarding the question of international courts, pursuant to 
Article 344 of TFEU, the EU member States “undertake not to submit 
a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaties 
                                                            
37. See TEU, supra note 11, art. 21. 
38. See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 593–94; Case C 26/62, Van 
Gend & Loos, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12. 
39. In the Court's Opinion 2/13, slip op. (Dec. 18, 2014) concerning the EU Accession 
Agreement to the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court took a long view from its 
classic rulings—van Gend & Loos, Costa v. Enel—confirming that the Union law constitutes a 
separate legal order with its own institutions and specific character. In particular, it stated that 
an international agreement should not affect the allocation of the powers established in the 
Treaties and thus the autonomy of the EU legal system, the observance of which is for the 
Court to ensure. This entails that the member States cannot submit a dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any other dispute resolution. It also entails that it 
is not for an outside body to take final and binding decisions regarding the division of powers 
between the European Union and the member States.  
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to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.” 
The commitment applies to mutual disputes between the EU member 
States relating to UNCLOS, which resulted in the Mox Plant 
judgment by the Court of Justice.40 The dispute involved two EU 
member States, Ireland and the UK, and related to the Irish concerns 
about radioactive discharges from Mox Plant in Sellafield, UK being 
released in the Irish Sea. The Irish request led to the establishment of 
an UNCLOS arbitration tribunal (and another tribunal under the 
OSPAR Convention, though that aspect was not part of the case in the 
ECJ). The UNCLOS Tribunal brought the matter to the attention of 
the EU institutions and suspended its proceedings. On that basis, the 
Commission started infringement proceedings against Ireland for 
having violated exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ in disputes between 
the Member States and the duty of loyal cooperation.  
The Court of Justice, once seized by the Commission, was able 
to point to Article 282 of UNCLOS as preserving its exclusive 
jurisdiction and permitting it to take precedence over the other dispute 
resolution mechanisms of UNCLOS. It had no difficulty concluding 
that Ireland had violated its obligations of what is now Article 344 
TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU relating to the duty for sincere 
cooperation. 
The long-standing basic principle in the EU is that international 
treaties are an integral part of EU law. Today, this “monistic starting 
point” is reflected in Article 216(2) TFEU, which provides as follows: 
“Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the 
institutions of the Union and on its Member States.” While Article 
216(2) says nothing on the status of customary international law, the 
practice of the EU judiciary has confirmed that also the customary 
law binds the EU.41 
It follows from that and it is well established that the terms of 
internal EU law should be interpreted in conformity with its 
international obligations.42 This goes as far as saying that even when 
the Union itself would not be a contracting party to an international 
agreement, but all of its member States are, the provisions of Union's 
                                                            
40  Commission v. Ireland, Case C-459/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-04635. 
41. Air Transp. Assoc. of Am. et al v. Commission, Case C-366/10, [2011] E.C.R.  I-
13755, ¶ 101. 
42. In Case C-61/94 Commission v. Germany, the Court confirmed that “the primacy of 
international agreements concluded by the Community over provisions of secondary 
Community legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in 
a manner that is consistent with those agreements.” [1996] ECR I-3989, at 52. 
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secondary law are interpreted by “taking into account” the 
international agreement.43 Moreover, in accordance with EU legal 
doctrine, in so far as the Union is bound by the international 
obligations concerned, these obligations prevail over secondary 
legislation and may result in the invalidity of conflicting provisions of 
secondary legislation.44 However, as noted later, the ability of 
individuals to invoke the provisions international agreements is 
subject to stringent conditions.  
In Case C-286/90 Poulsen, a preliminary ruling from a Danish 
Court concerning EU conservation measures concerning Atlantic 
Salmon, the Court of Justice ruled that the EU must respect customary 
international law in the exercise of its regulatory power and therefore 
the relevant provisions must be interpreted and their scope determined 
in conformity with the relevant rules of the law of the sea. In that 
respect, it stated that “account must be taken of the Geneva 
Conventions of 29 April 1958 on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone (United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 516, p. 205), on 
the High Seas (United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 450, p. 11) and on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 
(United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 559, p. 285), in so far as they 
codify general rules recognized by international custom, and also of 
the United Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of 
the Sea . . . . It has not entered into force, but many of its provisions 
are considered to express the current state of customary international 
maritime law . . . .”45 Furthermore, the Court considered that the EU 
prohibition was founded on an erga omnes obligation laid down in the 
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Territorial Sea and on the High Seas 
as well as in the UNCLOS (which was not yet in force). The Court 
stated that “[i]n the light of the aims of the prohibition laid down in 
Article 6(1)(b) of the Regulation, this provision must be interpreted so 
as to give it the greatest practical effect, within the limits of 
international law.”46 The Poulsen case has been considered significant 
                                                            
43.  Most recently confirmed in Case C-537/11 Manzi, Judgment of the Court of Justice, 
Jan. 23, 2014, at 45–47 (not yet published). Reversely, that principle does not extend to a 
situation when only some of the member States are parties to an international agreement, since 
it would extend the scope of the international obligation to those member States which are not 
contracting parties, which would be incompatible with the principle of the relative effect of 
treaties (“pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt”). 
44. Air Transp. Ass’n of America, Case C-366/10, ¶¶ 49–51. 
45. Poulsen & Diva Corp. v. Commission, C-286/90, [1992] E.C.R. I-06019, ¶ 10. 
46. Id. ¶ 11. 
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as it gave far-reaching importance to the rules of customary 
international law in the EU order.47 
A more recent case which should be mentioned is the Court's 
decision in joint cases C-103/12 and C-165/12, European Parliament 
and Commission v. Council (“Venezuelan Fishers”),48 which goes far 
beyond any international law compatible interpretation of EU law in a 
narrow sense, but it is an example of a broad international law based 
legal construction. The legal issue concerned the nature of an EU 
declaration and the internal decision-making procedures to be 
followed, involving the question of the role of the European 
Parliament. The case was brought against the Council's decision 
concerning approval of an EU declaration granting access to 
Venezuelan fishing vessels to conduct their activities in the EEZ off 
the coast of French Guyana, which forms part of EU waters. In the 
background, there was a difficulty to conclude a normal bilateral 
fisheries agreement with Venezuela, while it was considered 
necessary that the access to the waters rested on an international law 
based title. This led to an EU declaration addressed to Venezuela.49 In 
accordance with Article 62(2) of UNCLOS, the coastal state may 
grant access to its surplus fishing resources only “through agreements 
or other arrangements.” This raised a question regarding the use of 
normal treaty procedures , rather than a simple consultation which left 
little room for the Parliament. The Court agreed with the Parliament 
and the Commission, and considered that the full treaty making 
procedures, in the sense of Article 218(6) TFEU, should apply.  
The Court took a broad approach to the concept of international 
agreement. It considered the text of the EU declaration and the overall 
pattern of exchanges between the EU authorities and Venezuela. This 
was done in the context UNCLOS provisions relating to the 
respective roles and responsibilities of the coastal state and the flag 
state. The Court stated that UNCLOS “provides the framework for the 
                                                            
47. See Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, The European Community, the European Court of 
Justice and the Law of the Sea, 23 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 643, 692 (2008). 
48. Judgment of the Court of Justice, Nov. 26, 2014 (not yet published). 
49. As regards the form of a declaration, the Commission was originally inspired by the 
Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France and New Zealand v. France (Merits)), where the ICJ 
considered that the French unilateral statement to no longer conduct atmospheric nuclear tests 
which had taken place in the South Pacific Ocean was a legally binding international 
commitment. It stated that “[i]n announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric test would be 
the last, the French government conveyed to the world at large . . . its intention effectively to 
terminate these tests.” Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.) [1974] I.C.J. 253, ¶ 51 (Dec. 20).  
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European Union’s policy choices in relation to that zone and 
determines, inter alia, the legal instruments and forms available to it 
in making those choices.”50 It was then for the coastal to enter into 
“agreements or other arrangements,” as provided for in Article 62(2) 
of UNCLOS, for permitting access to the surplus fishing resources in 
its EEZ.51 The Court noted that an agreement may be based on several 
documents, and that individuals are not independent holders of rights 
under UNCLOS.52 Instead, it is for the flag state to exercise its 
responsibilities over the fishing vessels flying its flag. Taking into 
account all these elements, the EU declaration was construed as an 
offer to Venezuela, which required approval.53 The Court looked 
thereafter at the behavior and exchanges involving Venezuelan 
authorities. The Court considered Venezuela’s requests for fishing 
authorizations, failure to demand amendments to fishing conditions 
and even its expressed concern regarding the potential questioning of 
the declaration. These elements, taken together, led the Court to 
characterize the declaration as constituting an agreement for the 
purposes of the applicable EU procedures.54 
The Court's broader message to the question of access to EEZ 
seems to be that it is a matter of public policy and this should be 
reflected in the form of legal arrangements and procedures. It requires 
proper arrangements at the level of international law and it requires 
normal procedures of the legislature at the internal level, rather than 
procedures tailored to technical matters.55  
It is significant that Article 216(2) TFEU makes international 
agreements concluded by the Union binding, not only for its 
                                                            
50. Judgment of the Court 55. 
51. Id. ¶ 59. 
52. Id. ¶¶ 61, 63.  
53. Id. ¶ 68. 
54. Id. ¶¶ 69–73. Advocate General Sharpston reached the same conclusion but sounds 
amusingly pragmatic:  
On balance, however, applying Article 218 TFEU by analogy appears to be the most 
workable solution, even if that conclusion requires stretching and squeezing the text 
of the provision because not each and every part can apply to unilaterally biding 
declarations in the same way as to an international agreement. 
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, European Parliament and Commission v. Council of 
the European Union, Case C-103/12 and C-165/12, ¶ 123 (2014).  
55. The Court concluded that the Council decision of approval of the declaration should 
be based on Article 43(2) TFEU, with ordinary legislative procedure, involving the Parliament 
as co-legislator, rather than Article 43(3) concerning decisions on “fishing opportunities” 
which are decided by the Council alone. European Parliament and Commission v. Council of 
the European Union, Case C-103/12 and C-165/12, ¶¶ 48–50 (2014).  
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institutions, but also for the member States. This means, for instance, 
that the EU law principle of sincere cooperation applies with regard to 
its international obligations and thus the member States are under the 
legal commitment to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations and to 
facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks in that respect.56 This 
is also important in order to avoid an issue concerning the EU’s 
responsibility at the international level. 
These elements open the way for the Commission to exercise its 
function as the “guardian” of the Treaties and ensure that the member 
States comply with the Union’s international obligations. The 
Commission can bring infringement cases against the member States 
in case of non-compliance with international obligations, and has 
done so at least in some circumstances, even though this infrequently 
happens in practice.57 
The issue of whether individuals can invoke provisions of 
international agreements against conflicting EU secondary legislation 
(the doctrine of “direct effect”) under the EU legal system has been 
subject to a vivid debate and comprehensive judicial practice.58 If the 
parties have not determined this issue in the agreement itself, it is for 
the courts to decide. In that case, in accordance with the classic 
formula, this depends on whether the provision concerned contains a 
clear and precise obligation which is not subject to the adoption of 
any subsequent measure of implementation. In addition, attention is 
paid to the nature of the agreement as a whole, including for instance 
its institutional framework and derogations.59 The nature of the 
agreement has turned out to be the decisive criterion in the case of 
multilateral agreements such as the WTO/GATT Agreement, which 
has not been considered to confer rights to individuals. Similar 
elements affecting the assessment of the nature of WTO/GATT have 
since been brought to bear on UNCLOS as reflected in the leading 
case Intertanko below. 
                                                            
56. TEU, supra note 11, at 18. For the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, see O.J. C 83 of 30 March 
2010, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:
FULL&from=en. 
57. Esa Paasivirta and Pieter Jan Kuijper, Does One Size Fit All? The European 
Community and the Responsibility of International Organizations, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 
169, 198–99 (2005).  
58.  On the development of the EU judicial practice, see PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL 
RELATIONS LAW 331–35 (2d ed. 2012). 
59. The best known elaboration of the doctrine is Case C-104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. 
Kupferberg. [1982] E.C.R. 3641 at 20–26. 
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The Case C-308/06 Intertanko v. Secretary of State for 
Transport raised the issue of whether private litigants can invoke 
UNCLOS and Marpol Convention against the validity of allegedly 
conflicting rules of the Ship-Source Pollution Directive, 2005/35/EC. 
The case was brought to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling 
by the UK High Court of Justice. The Court confirmed the principle 
that the Community’s international obligations prevail over its 
secondary legislation, but it held that the validity of the Directive 
could not be assessed by the two Conventions. While the Directive 
incorporated some of the provisions of the Marpol Convention, it 
could not be reviewed against that Convention since the Community 
was not a party to that Convention and it was therefore not binding on 
the Community. As regards UNCLOS, the private litigants were 
barred from invoking its provisions in particular because the 
Convention “does not establish rules intended” to apply directly to 
individuals and confer them rights that can be invoked against States. 
The Court referred to the “nature and broad logic” of the agreement, 
aiming primarily to codify and develop general international law 
relating to peaceful cooperation and seeking to strike a fair “balance” 
between the interests of coastal States and flag States. Following the 
Intertanko case, UNCLOS clearly belongs to a specific category of 
international agreements, along with the WTO/GATT Agreement, 
which are not considered to confer direct rights to individuals. 
In so far as customary international law has been invoked in the 
EU judiciary, it has been done normally with regard to issues of 
interpretation, and only exceptionally as a basis to review the legality 
of EU legislation. Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of 
America v. Secretary for State of Energy and Climate Change, a 
preliminary ruling request from the UK High Court, raised the 
question of whether the private parties, with headquarters in the 
United States, could rely on the customary law  of the sea principle 
pursuant to which no State may validly purport to subject any part of 
the high seas to its sovereignty (and thus air space above it). This was 
aimed at challenging the validity of the Directive 2003/87/EC scheme 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading, as amended by 
Directive 2008/101/EC, so as to include aviation activities in that 
scheme. The Court, after noting that a principle of customary 
international law does not have the same degree of precision as a 
provision of an international agreement, went on in line with earlier 
case law stating that the judicial review must be limited to “manifest 
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errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those 
principles.”60 The Court concluded in the end that the examination of 
of Directive 2008/101/EC disclosed no fact of such kind to affect its 
validity. While this case did not involve UNCLOS in formal terms, 
the question from the referring national court concerning a particular 
principle of customary international law, the Court followed broadly 
the tenet of the above Intertanko case, in the sense that it applied a 
demanding test (“manifest error”) to the issue involving individuals 
relying on the international law of the sea to challenge the validity of 
EU secondary legislation. This stringent approach is all the more 
noticeable since the principle at stake corresponds to Article 89 of 
UNCLOS, which is the only provision where the Convention itself 
explicitly confirms the invalidity of any claims over its basic 
freedoms, here the freedom of the high seas. 
B. Law of the Sea and the Geographic Scope of EU Law 
The law of the sea is special in the sense that the rights and 
obligations are related to certain sea areas. UNCLOS itself takes a 
zonal approach to the sea and lays down the rules and principles, not 
only in relation to different activities as such, but to the rights and 
obligations that depend on where the activities take place. The 
Convention contains rules in respect to internal waters, territorial seas 
(Articles 2–32), contiguous zones (Article 33), the continental shelf 
(Articles 76–85), the exclusive economic zone (Articles 55–75), the 
high seas (Articles 86–120), the area of deep sea bed (Articles 133–
191), international straits (Articles 34–45), and archipelagic waters 
(Article 46–54).61 International law relating to seas does not give 
States the same degree of power as permitted over its own territory. 
For instance, ships under another State’s flag enjoy innocent passage 
in territorial seas (Article 17). 
These zones are relevant to the national legislature and the 
judiciary needs to interpret and construe laws by taking these aspects 
into account. The same applies to the EU legislature and judiciary. 
The EU legislature acts in principle either as a coastal state or a flag 
                                                            
60. Air Transp. Assoc. of Am., Case C-366/10, ¶ 110 (2011). The Court followed Case 
C-162/96 Racke and Hauptzollamt Mainz, which applied the manifest error test in a case 
where a private company invoked the customary principle of fundamental change of 
circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) against an agreement concluded by the Community. [1998] 
ECR I-03655 at 52. 
61. For a useful overview, see Hickey, supra note 4. 
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state legislature subject to conditions and limitations under 
international law. 
However, in the case of the EU, the scope of its legislation 
depends, in addition, on the territorial scope of the EU Treaties. In 
accordance with Article 52 TEU, the Treaties apply to the member 
States, without containing any definition of “EU area.”62 This is 
generally understood as referring to all the areas that are within 
sovereignty or jurisdiction of the member States, including maritime 
areas.63 In this case, the territorial scope of application of EU 
legislation may extend to all areas and activities where the member 
States exercise full sovereignty or enjoy “sovereign rights.” EU law 
therefore normally applies to the member States’ inland, coastal, and 
territorial waters, as well as to the EEZ (within the limits of the 
enjoyed sovereign rights) and to the vessels flying the flag of a 
Member State. It is possible, however, that the intent of the legislature 
may sometimes be to limit the territorial application in some 
respects.64 
It suffices to give some examples. In Case C-6/04 Commission 
of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland,65 regarding the application of Directive 
                                                            
62. Some areas of the Member States are excluded or have a special status, as defined in 
Article 355 TFEU. 
63. Advocate General Villaón described the point as follows:  
As stated in Article 1 TEU, the European Union is the result of the desire of the 
States establishing it to attain their common objectives by conferring on it certain 
competences. Whether such competences belong to the Member States by virtue of 
their sovereignty or were originally the result of international law conferring a 
sovereign right is immaterial for the purposes of defining the limits of Union 
competences, as the Union will exercise precisely those competences conferred on it 
(Article 5 TEU), on the terms agreed in the Treaties, having regard to the content 
and extent of such competences when exercised by the States themselves prior to 
entering into the Union.  
The determining factor in defining the scope of EU law is, therefore, the extent of 
the competences lawfully exercised by the Member States within the framework of 
international law. EU law will apply to whatever extent the Member States exercise 
official authority in the areas of competence conferred on the Union, subject to 
conditions established by EU law and irrespective of the source of the entitlement to 
the State competence transferred to the EU; in other words, irrespective of whether 
the source of the entitlement was State sovereignty itself (as recognised and 
protected by international law) or the conferral by the international community of a 
sovereign right. 
Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, A. Salemink v. Raad van bestuur van het 
Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen, Case C-347/10, ¶¶ 54-55 (2011).  
64. Aktiebolaget NN v. Skatteverket, Case C-111/05, [2007] ECR I-2697, ¶ 53.  
65.  [2005] ECR I-907, ¶ 117.  
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92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
and flora, the Court confirmed that the Directive applied beyond the 
member States’ territorial waters, in the EEZ and on the continental 
shelf where the UK exercised sovereign rights. 
In Case C-111/05 Aktiebolaget NN v. Skatterverket,66 involving 
the application of the Sixth VAT Directive to the laying and supply of 
submarine cables, the Court emphasized that the sovereignty of the 
coastal State over the continental shelf and the EEZ was merely 
functional and limited to the right to exercise the activities of 
exploration laid down in Article 56 and 77 of UNCLOS. To the extent 
that the supply and laying down of undersea cable was not included in 
the activities listed in those articles, that part of the operation carried 
out in the EEZ and the continental shelf is not within the sovereignty 
of the coastal State. Thus, those activities were not subject to VAT for 
the part of the transaction carried out in those two maritime zones. 
In Case C-347/10 A. Salemink v. Raad van bestuur van het 
Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen, the Court confirmed 
that work carried out on fixed or floating installations positioned on 
the Netherlands’ continental shelf for prospecting and/or the 
exploitation of natural resources, is to be regarded as work carried out 
in the territory of the State for the purposes of applying EU law. It 
referred to the nature of the continental shelf as the natural 
prolongation of the land territory, as ruled by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, as well as to UNLCOS Article 77 (rights of 
the coastal State over the continental shelf) in conjunction with 
Article 80 (installations) and concluded:  
A member State which takes advantage of the economic rights to prospect and/or 
exploit natural resources on that part of the continental shelf which is adjacent to it 
cannot avoid the application of the EU law provisions designed to ensure the 
freedom of movement of persons working on such installations.67 
CONCLUSION 
The first part of this Essay described the EU participation in 
UNCLOS and its implementation under international law. The EEC 
was originally an observer in the UNLCOS negotiations and then 
became a contracting party to UNCLOS in respect of the public 
powers that its member States have conferred to it. For this it had to 
declare its competences related to the law of the sea, in order to 
                                                            
66.  [2007] ECR I-2697, ¶ 59.  
67. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 4, ¶ 9 (Feb. 20).  
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communicate and explain to other treaty partners its unique position 
in relation to the EU and the member States which are also UNCLOS 
contracting parties. Since then, the EU has participated in the 
implementation of UNCLOS, including two international arbitrations 
that were finally settled by way of negotiation. The EU has also taken 
part in the proceedings of the recent case ITLOS No. 21 concerning 
an advisory opinion in the area of IUU fishing activities. Though the 
EU is not a State, as a contracting party it acts alongside States on the 
basis of the public powers conferred to it by its member States. This 
has been recognized by other States, which now deal directly with the 
EU rather than indirectly via the member States, as shown for 
instance in the arbitration and judicial practice. The second part of the 
Article discussed the UNCLOS implementation under EU law, 
commenting on the ways it is integrated into the EU legal system and 
how the EU’s legal and institutional principles and disciplines apply 
to the Convention.  This internal implementation also reflects how the 
“EU law prolongation” operates in regard to the zonal approaches of 
the Convention.  
The participation in UNCLOS may seem, as viewed from inside, 
an inevitable outcome of the internal developments of European 
integration. It would be impossible for the EU member States to 
participate in UNCLOS without the EU participation. This was clear 
already during the negotiations of the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference which lead to the EU participation in UNCLOS as a 
contracting party. It is even clearer today. This should not, however, 
hide the fact that participation in the international law system, 
designed for States and by them, is rarely self-evident for others, even 
for an important global actor. It is however possible and UNLCOS is 
an important milestone.  
 
